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SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE
"ARISE FROM OR RELATE TO" REQUIREMENT ...
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
I. INTRODUCTION
At one time, the issue of personal jurisdiction was without intricacies.'
For many years the case of Pennoyer v. Nefjf established that the only
proper bases for a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction were consent
by the defendant, physical presence in the forum at the time of service of
process, and domicile in the forum state.3 Today, however, the issue of
personal jurisdiction is far less rigid, and, consequently, far less simple.4 A
particularly troublesome problem that courts face today is the confusion
and inconsistency of the requirement that a cause of action "arise from or
relate to"'5 the defendant's contacts with the forum state in order for a
1. See ROBERT C. CASAD, JuRISDICTiON iN CrvI. ACTIONS 1-8 (1991) (recognizing that
at one time courts adhered to strict bases for personal jurisdiction without exception). As a
consequence of rigid adherence to the standards of personal jurisdiction, courts could easily
settle the issue of personal jurisdiction.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878)
3. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (holding that personal jurisdiction
does not exist "where a defendant does not appear in the court, and is not found within the
state, and is not a resident thereof"); CASAD, supra note 1, at 1-8 (noting that after Pennoyer
v. Neff, only appropriate bases for jurisdiction were consent, presence, and domicile).
Pennoyer involved an action for the recovery of a tract of land in Oregon by Neff, a
resident of California, from Pennoyer. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719. Pennoyer acquired the
property through a sheriff's sale of Neff's land in satisfaction of a judgment against Neff
issued by an Oregon court. Id. The property was not the subject of the judgment against Neff
and was sold only in satisfaction of that judgment. Id. at 720. Neff challenged the legitimacy
of the sheriff's sale arguing that the Oregon court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Id.
at 719. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon invalidated the
judgment against Neff on other grounds, holding that there were fatal defects in the statutorily
required order of publication. Id. at 720. The United States Supreme Court, however, found
no such defects but affirmed the judgment of the district court on the ground that the Oregon
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Neff. Id. at 722. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Field, set forth an all-or-nothing standard by which a state has unquestionable
jurisdictional authority over persons within its territory and no jurisdictional authority over
persons not within its territory. Id. The Court noted that at the time of the judgment against
Neff in Oregon, Neff was not a resident of Oregon, was not served with process in Oregon,
and did not voluntarily appear in Oregon for the adjudication. Id. at 719-20. The Court's
opinion firmly established the rule of territoriality in determining personal jurisdiction.
4. See CAsAD, supra note 1, at 1-8 (recognizing that traditional bases for jurisdiction
have expanded and thinking on jurisdiction has become more sophisticated). Because rigidity
fosters simplicity, as the standards for personal jurisdiction have become far less restrictive,
they have become more complex. Id.
5. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (stating "arise from
or relate to" requirement); infra text accompanying notes 81-83 (discussing origins of "arise
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court to assert specific personal jurisdiction. 6 With the United States Su-
preme Court's refusal to consider. this issue in Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines,7 it appears that the confusion will persist.'
A. A Brief History of Contemporary Personal Jurisdiction
The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 abandoned
the outdated jurisdictional standards of Pennoyer and established an entirely
new perspective on the issue of personal jurisdiction. 0 In International Shoe,
from or relate to" requirement). The test for specific personal jurisdiction "is satisfied if the
defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation
results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger King, 471
U.S. at 472.
6. See United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1080, 1089 (lst Cir. 1992) (describing lack of consistency in application of "arise from
or relate to" requirement in specific personal jurisdiction); infra text accompanying notes 35-
44 (discussing problem with "arise from or relate to" requirement).
7. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
8. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise
Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 323, 338-39, 369 (1992) (noting
that Supreme Court's refusal to address "arise from or relate to" issue surprised many
followers of Carnival Cruise Lines, and left open important jurisdiction questions).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326.U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (noting Court's
departure from Pennoyer v. Neff); Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and Substantial
Justice": How Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18
HAsn~os CONST. L.Q. 441, 442 (1991) (stating that International Shoe signaled modern era
for concepts of personal jurisdiction); Bert Hart et al., Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Corporations Based on a Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342,
342-43 (1958) (discussing turning point in personal jurisdiction represented by International
Shoe).
International Shoe involved an action brought by and in the state of, Washington for the
recovery of unpaid contributions to an unemployment fund established by state statute.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311. The defendant, International Shoe Company, was a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri and engaged in the
manufacture and sale of footwear. Id. at 313. Although International Shoe maintained no
office in Washington and made no contracts there for the sale or purchase of merchandise,
the company did employ, during the years in question, 11 to 13 salesmen who resided in
Washington and performed their principal activities for the company in Washington. Id.
International Shoe claimed that its activities within the state were insufficient to establish a
"presence" in the state; therefore, personal jurisdiction under the territorial rule of Pennoyer
was lacking. Id. at 315-16.
The Supreme Court set forth a new jurisdictional standard whereby "presence" was no
longer necessary when a defendant's contacts with the forum state are such that it would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play substantial justice" to maintain the suit in the forum
state. Id. at 316. The Court noted that under this standard, casual and infrequent activities
that are unconnected to the cause of action would not sustain personal jurisdiction, while
continuous and systematic activity giving rise to the cause of action should always be sufficient.
Id. at 317. Apart from these two extremes, the Court stated that some instances of isolated
yet claim-related activity may be sufficient as well as some instances of systematic and
continuous activity that is unrelated to the cause of action. Id. at 318-19. With regard to
International Shoe Company, the Court concluded that the company's actions were both
continuous and systematic, and related to the cause of action; therefore, personal jurisdiction
was held proper. Id. at 320.
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the Court made clear that plaintiffs no longer were bound by Pennoyer's
mechanical requirements of consent, physical presence, or domicile, by
stating that a* court may assert jurisdiction over any defendant having
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."'' t
Over the last twelve years, the Court has crafted the language of
International Shoe into a two-pronged constitutional analysis for personal
jurisdiction. 2 The first prong concerns whether the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state. 3 After satisfying this requirement,
a court will determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with fair play and substantial justice.' 4 This second prong is
known commonly as the "reasonableness" standard.'5 Although the Court
has established firmly the reasonableness requirement as the second step of
the constitutional analysis, 6 its practical effect is the subject of some
controversy.' 7 The Supreme Court has stated that the satisfaction of the
minimum contacts inquiry creates a strong presumption of reasonableness.'
11. Id. at 316; see Abramson, supra note 10, at 442 (noting that International Shoe
marked retreat from strict standard of Pennoyer v. Nefj); Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the
Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DuKE L.J. 669, 670 (same). But see Wendy Collins
Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 WAsH. L. Rav. 479, 508 (1987) (noting that although Supreme Court has
abandoned physical presence rule, "the doctrinal core" of Pennoyer, that personal jurisdiction
requirement is substantive due process right, remains).
12. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987) (applying
two-part test); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (stating that
constitutional inquiry involves two-part analysis of minimum contacts and reasonableness);
Abramson, supra note 10, at 441 (recognizing that two-part test evolved from series of Supreme
Court cases).
For a discussion of the more recent Supreme Court cases on personal jurisdiction, see
Maltz, supra note 11, at 669 (analyzing significant Supreme Court cases leading up to Asahi).
13. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-13 (applying minimum contacts portion of two-part test);
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-82 (same); see also Abramson, supra note 10, at 441 (noting
that finding of minimum contacts is first part of two-part personal jurisdiction test).
14. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16 (applying reasonableness analysis); Burger King, 471
U.S. at 476 (holding that "reasonableness" analysis should follow minimum contacts inquiry);
Abramson, supra note 10, at 441 (same).
15. See Abramson, supra note 10, at 441 (identifying second prong of constitutional
analysis as "reasonableness" or "fair play" standard).
16. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 680-81 (noting that Burger King implied, and Asahi
affirmed, that "reasonableness" is second part of constitutional analysis). The Burger King
opinion was the first to make clear that "unreasonableness" possibly could create a basis for
denial of personal jurisdiction in otherwise permissible cases, and Asahi was the first case to
actually deny jurisdiction on this ground. But see infra text accompanying note 20 (noting
that Court in Asahi did not reach majority conclusion that "unreasonableness" was basis for
denial of personal jurisdiction because four members of Court held that defendant did not
have minimum contacts).
17. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 680 (noting that prior to Asahi, Supreme Court had
never denied personal jurisdiction despite showing of minimum contacts).
18. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (stating that where
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Moreover, the Court has denied personal jurisdiction on the basis of
unreasonableness only once,19 and even then the Court divided on whether
the defendant had minimum contacts.20 Although the Court continues to
examine reasonableness as a distinct prong, it would appear that the finding
of minimum contacts will be controlling in the vast majority of situations. 2'
Just as International Shoe and its progeny established the two-pronged
constitutional analysis, the cases also have established that the minimum
contacts prong is satisfied in two distinct contexts.22 In 1966 Professors
Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman formally identified these
two contexts as general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdic-
tion.23 The doctrine of general jurisdiction suggests that a defendant can
have contacts with the forum state "so substantial and of such a nature"
that the state may assert jurisdiction over the defendant even for causes of
action unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state.? In Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,2- the Supreme Court stated that the degree
of contacts with the forum must be "continuous and systematic" to justify
the assertion of general personal jurisdiction over unrelated causes of
defendant has minimum contacts with forum, personal jurisdiction is prima facie reasonable;
in order to rebut presumption of reasonableness "he must present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable").
19. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (finding personal jurisdiction unreasonable in light of heavy burden on defendant
in having to defend case in forum state).
20. See id. at 116-22 (revealing that majority of Court did not conclude that "unreason-
ableness" created sole basis for denial of personal jurisdiction); Maltz, supra note 11, at 681
(noting that Court was deeply divided on whether defendant had established minimum contacts).
Four members of the Court felt that the defendant's mere knowledge that its products would
be purchased in the forum state (the "stream of commerce" theory) was insufficient to create
a showing of "purposeful availment;" thus, minimum contacts were not present. Asahi, 480
U.S. at 105, 108-13. This portion of the Court held that due process required a "stream of
commerce" plus some affirmative effort on the part of the defendant. Id. By contrast, a
separate four members of the Court concluded that "stream of commerce" standing alone
satisfied minimum contacts, but nonetheless determined that the assertion of personal juris-
diction over the defendant was unreasonable. Id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring). Con-
sequently, Asahi does not represent a case where a majority of the Court has denied jurisdiction
exclusively on the basis on "unreasonableness."
21. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that cases where finding
of minimum contacts, standing alone, is insufficient for assertion of personal jurisdiction are
"rare").
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984) (holding
that jurisdiction is proper in two circumstantial categories); infra text accompanying notes 24-
30 (discussing two categories of personal jurisdiction).
23. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1135-45 (1966) (identifying and naming two basic
categories of personal jurisdiction as general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction).
The Supreme Court formally recognized the general and specific classifications in Heli-
copteros. 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
24. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); see von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 23, at 1121, 1144 (discussing general jurisdiction).
25. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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action.2 6 Significantly, the Supreme Court has found a defendant's contacts
to be "continuous and systematic" on only one occasion.2 7 It is not
surprising, therefore, that specific rather than general jurisdiction accounts
for the majority of personal jurisdiction litigation.
28
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant's contacts are
limited, yet connected with the plaintiff's claim such that the cause of
action "arises from or relates to" the defendant's contacts with the forum.
29
26. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (stating
that case fails requirements of general jurisdiction unless defendant's contacts with forum state
are "continuous and systematic").
Helicopteros involved a wrongful death action brought in the state of Texas against
Helicol, a Colombian corporation. Id. at 409, 412. The action was based on an accident that
took place in Peru when a Helicol helicopter carrying the decedents crashed. Id. at 410. The
decedents were American employees of a Peruvian consortium which was the alter ego of a
Texas based joint venture. Id. The facts revealed the following contacts with the state of
Texas: (1) Helicol's chief executive officer flew to Houston to discuss Helicol's services and
negotiate a contract with representatives of the Texas joint venture; (2) Over a period of eight
years Helicol purchased approximately 80% of its helicopters and substantial quantities of
spare parts out of Texas; (3) Helicol sent pilots to Texas for training and additional personnel
to Texas for technical consultation; (4) Helicol received payments from a Texas bank. Id. at
410-11.
In district court, Helicol moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and was
denied. Id. at 412. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that personal
jurisdiction over Helicol in Texas was lacking. Id. The Texas Supreme Court initially affirmed
but later reversed the opinion of the Civil Appeals Court, concluding that Texas courts had
jurisdiction over Helicol. Id.
The United States Supreme Court, applying a general jurisdiction analysis, held that the
contacts by Helicol with the state of Texas were not continuous and systematic and, therefore,
could not sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction. Id. at 418. Specifically, the Court stated
that purchases of equipment, even if made at regular intervals, are not sufficient contacts for
general jurisdiction. Id. Additionally, the Court found that Helicol's sending of personnel to
Texas for training did not enhance the quality or significance of Helicol's contacts. Id.
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which he assigned greater significance to
Helicol's Texas contacts and concluded that general jurisdiction would be proper. Id. at 423-
24.
27. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (holding that,
based on facts of Perkins, application of general jurisdiction would be proper). In Perkins the
president of the defendant corporation lived and maintained an office in the forum state and
conducted various business affairs there including the upkeep of office files, sending and
receiving business correspondence, drawing and distribution of salary checks, supervision of
the corporation's well-being, disbursement of funds to cover corporation expenditures, and
the use of forum state banks for the transfer and maintenance of corporate funds. Id. at 447-
48. The Court thus concluded that the defendant corporation had carried on "continuous and
systematic" activities within the forum state. Id.; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 23, at 1144 (noting that "the Perkins facts should be regarded as a decision on its
exceptional facts, not as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdic-
tion").
28. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. Rnv. 610, 630
(1988) (noting that exercise of general jurisdiction is rare).
29. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985) (describing specific
personal jurisdiction); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (same). When the cause of action arises
from or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum, a court can exercise specific
jurisdiction. Id.
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The connection between the forum state, the defendant's activities, and the
cause of action establish a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate; therefore, a
court's jurisdiction is limited, thus "specific," to the related cause of
action.3 0
Because the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is far more common
than the exercise of general jurisdiction, courts must be confident in their
understanding and application of the specific jurisdiction analysis. The
Supreme Court has been helpful in this regard by clarifying the scope of
specific personal jurisdiction in two important aspects. First, for a contact
to qualify under this analysis, it must be a "purposeful availment" by the
defendant of the benefits of conducting activities within the forum state3
or with forum state residents.3 2 Second, the number of these purposefully
availed contacts can be minimal.3 Indeed, the Court has held that a single
contact with the forum can be sufficient if the cause of action arises from
that contact. 34
B. The Problem with "Arise from or Relate 1to"
Although the Court has been helpful in determining what constitutes a
"contact" and how many contacts are necessary, a substantial degree of
uncertainty still exists as to the constitutional limits of specific jurisdiction. 35
Most notable is the confusion concerning the interpretation of "arise from
30. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1136 (noting that specific jurisdiction
is limited to related causes of action, thus, is "specific" to related causes of action).
31. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958)). The Hanson Court stated and the Burger King Court reaffirmed that:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. The
application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.
Id.
32. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that dealings withi residents of forum
state, without physical presence in state, can be sufficient). As long as the defendant has
"purposely availed" herself of the benefits of doing business with forum residents, the fact
that defendant has not actually entered the forum will not prevent the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. Id.
33. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 671 (noting Supreme Court's approval of personal
jurisdiction based on single forum contact by defendant in McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co.).
34. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (affirming assertion
of personal jurisdiction based on one forum contact). According to the McGee Court, the
defendant's contact with the forum state satisfied due process because the plaintiff's action
"was based on a contract which had a substantial connection with [the forum state.]" Id. at
223. The McGee Court noted that "[t]he [insurance] contract was delivered in [the forum
state], the premiums were mailed from [the forum state] and the insured was a resident of
[the forum state] when he died." Id.
35. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 633 (stating that constitutional limits of specific
personal jurisdiction are unknown).
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or relate to."I36 Much constitutional weight rides on the application of this
one phrase.37 Consider the following jurisdictional truths: (1) A finding of
minimum contacts, through either a specific or general jurisdictional anal-
ysis, is usually conclusive; therefore, the "reasonableness" prong of the
two-part constitutional test is little more than a rubber stamp;" (2) courts
usually base personal jurisdiction on a specific, rather than general, juris-
dictional analysis;39 and (3) a single contact with the forum state may
provide the basis for specific personal jurisdiction, provided that the cause
of action arises from or relates to that contact4 0 Because of these three
jurisdictional truths, the propriety of asserting jurisdiction can, under the
proper circumstances, rest solely on the interpretation of the "arise from
or relate to" requirement.
4 '
The "arise from or relate to" requirement is the essence of specific
personal jurisdiction because it defines the necessary relationship between
the defendant and the forum state.42 It follows, therefore, that a misappli-
cation of "arise from or relate to" is tantamount to a misapplication of
due process. 43 For this reason, if courts are to recognize, and they should,
that the limits of constitutional due process should not vary from one court
to another, courts must have a firm and consistent understanding of "arise
from or relate to. ' 44
36. See United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing uncertainty among circuits on issue of "arise from
or relate to").
37. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look At General Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv.
721, 736 (1988) (arguing that determining whether cause of action and defendant's contacts
are related is crucial to jurisdictional analysis because it determines whether specific or general
jurisdiction will be used).
38. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (stating that cases are "rare" where minimum contacts, standing alone, are
insufficient for personal jurisdiction); supra text accompanying notes 18-21 (discussing fact
that minimum contacts are usually dispositive of personal jurisdiction issue).
39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that exercise of general jurisdiction
is rare).
40. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 671 (noting Supreme Court's approval of personal
jurisdiction based on one forum contact in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.); supra text
accompanying notes 33-34 (discussing low threshold contact requirement for specific jurisdic-
tion).
41. See Jodi E. Saposnick, Federal Practice and Procedure: Personal Jurisdiction, 1985
ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 349, 358-59 (noting that whether or not defendant's contacts are related
to plaintiff's cause of action can control jurisdictional inquiry).
42. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1136 (noting that, with specific
jurisdiction, basis for court's jurisdiction to adjudicate is element of relatedness between cause
of action and forum contacts).
43. See Stan Mayo, Note, Specific Jurisdiction: Time for a "Related to" Analysis, 4
REv. Lrno. 341, 342-43 (1985) (suggesting that courts cannot properly apply due process
standards without properly applying "arise from or relate to" requirement).
44. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 680-81 (concluding that court's jurisdictional stan-
dards, both specific and general, must become uniform for development of sound jurisdictional
practice).
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Despite the obvious importance of the "arise from or relate to" re-
quirement, the commentary on jurisdictional due process surprisingly dis-
misses this issue. 45 In addition, although the Supreme Court has had the
opportunity to comment on this issue twice in the past eight years, a
majority of the Court has declined to do so.
46
II. THE SUPR.M CoR~T CASES
The first case in which the Supreme Court identified the problems
associated with the "arise from or relate to" requirement was Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall.47 In Helicopteros the defendant (Helicol),
a Colombian Corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota,
provided helicopter transportation for South American oil and construction
companies." In 1974 Helicol entered into negotiations with a Texas-based
joint venture and eventually agreed to provide its services for the venture's
pipeline construction project in South America.49 On January 26, 1976, in
the process of providing its services for the Texas organization, one of
Helicol's helicopters crashed in Peru.50 Four American employees of the
Texas organization died in the crash, and the plaintiffs, survivors of the
decedents, brought wrongful death actions against Helicol in a Texas district
court."'
Despite Helicol's motion to dismiss, the state district court and the
Texas Supreme Court on appeal found Texas jurisdiction over Helicol
proper.5 2 The facts of the case indicated that Helicol maintained no office
in Texas, had no agent for service of process in Texas, was not licensed to
do business and engaged in no helicopter operations in Texas, and recruited
no employees in Texas.53 The facts, however, also indicated that Helicol
did have many contacts with the state of Texas including 'contract negotia-
tions with the Texas organization, large purchases of helicopters and equip-
ment in Teas, and the training of pilots and other personnel in Texas
4A
45. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 37, at 736 (noting that commentary on jurisdictional
due process is "strangely silent" on "arise from or relate to" issue); supra text accompanying
notes 37-44 (discussing importance of "arise from or relate to" requirement in analysis for
personal jurisdiction).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-80 (describing Supreme Court's handling of
"arise from or relate to" issue in Helicopteros and Carnival Cruise Lines).
47. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
48. Id. at 409.
49. Id. at 410.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and the
Texas Supreme Court originally upheld the judgement of the appeals court. Id. On rehearing,
however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appeals court and reinstated
the ruling of the district court. Id.
53. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 638 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1982) (opinion
of Texas Supreme Court upon rehearing).
54. See id. at 871-72. In Helicopteros, the Texas Supreme Court found:
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For purposes of the "arise from or relate to" requirement, Helicopteros
could have been the perfect test case.55 It presented the atypical situation
in which the cause of action arguably, but not obviously, arose from or
related to the contact with the forum state.56 For instance, although the
direct cause of the crash in Helicopteros was the alleged negligence of the
pilot, the plaintiffs could have argued that without the contract with the
Texas organization, the decedents would not have been aboard Helicol's
helicopter or died in the crash. 57 Additionally, plaintiffs could have argued
that without Helicol's contacts with Texas, Helicol would be unable to
operate, and no crash would have occurred.58 Unfortunately, the plaintiffs
did not make these arguments.
Because the plaintiffs did not make the "arise from or relate to"
arguments, the Supreme Court inquiry concerned only whether Helicol's
contacts were sufficient for general jurisdiction. 9 In limiting its analysis to
general jurisdiction, the Helicopteros Court noted that both parties had
conceded that the causes of action did not "arise from or relate to" the
In addition to negotiating this contract [with the Texas organization], Helicol
committed all of the following acts in Texas:
a. Purchased substantially all of its helicopter fleet in Fort Worth, Texas;
b. Did approximately $4,000,000 worth of business in Fort Worth, Texas, from
1970 through 1976 as purchaser of equipment, parts and services. This consisted of
spending an average of $50,000 per month with Bell Helicopter Company, a Texas
corporation;
c. Negotiated in Houston, Harris County, Texas, with a Texas 'resident, which
negotiation resulted in the contract to provide the helicopter services involving the
crash leading to this cause of action . .. and wherein Helicol agreed to obtain
liability insurance payable in American dollars to cover a claim such as this;
d. Sent pilots to Fort Worth, Texas to pick up helicopters as they were purchased
from Bell Helicopter and Fly them from Fort Worth to Colombia;
e. Sent maintenance personnel and pilots to Texas to be trained;
f. Had employees in Texas on a year-round rotation basis;
g. Received roughly $5,000,000 under the terms and provisions of the contract in
question here which payments were made from First City National Bank in Houston,
Texas; and
h. Directed the First City National Bank of Houston, Texas to make payments to
Rocky Mountain Helicopters pursuant to the contract in question.
Id.
55. See William M. Richman, Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part lI-A
Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 1328, 1338 (1984) (stating that facts in Helicopteros were excellent for defining
approach to cases faillng between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction).
56. See id. (recognizing that defendant Helicol had significant contacts with Texas that,
while not truly giving rise to cause of action, were not unrelated to plaintiffs' claims).
57. See Dennis G. Terez, The Misguided Helicopteros Case: Confusion in the Courts
Over Contacts, 37 BAYLOR L. Rav. 913, 934-35 n.l10 (1985) (recognizing that'plaintiffs in
Helicopteros clearly could have made arguments based on specific jurisdiction, and noting
several possibilities).
58. Id.
59. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hail, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984) (stating
that all parties conceded that cause of action did not "arise out of" or "relate to" defendant's
Texas activities, thus limiting analysis to general jurisdiction).
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defendant's activities. 60 Consequently, the Court concluded that the deter-
mination of the required nexus between a defendant's forum activities and
a plaintiff's cause of action was unnecessary.6 The fact that the opinion in
Helicopteros went so far as to state several questions it would not answer
makes the Court's declination all the more frustrating.62 By making this
statement, however, the Court at least recognized that these types of
questions exist.63 It simply declined to answer them.
Although the majority of the Court wished to wait for a case in which
the "arise from or relate to" questions faced them squarely,64 Justice
Brennan was not so inclined. 65 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan
first asserted that the Court based its refusal to consider the "arise from"
questions on an erroneous determination that the plaintiffs had conceded
that the causes of action did not relate to the defendant's Texas activities.6
Justice Brennan went on to argue that the Court should have recognized a
difference between the terms "arise from" and "relate to." 6 By recognizing
such a difference the Court could conclude that although the respondent's
causes of action may not formally arise from the defendant's forum contacts,
60. See id. (noting plaintiff's concession that cause of action did not "arise from or
relate to" defendant's activities in Texas). But see infra text accompanying note 66 (discussing
Justice Brennan's dissent in Helicopteros). Justice Brennan argued that the plaintiffs had not
conceded that the cause of action was unrelated to defendant's activities in the forum state.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 425 n.3.
61. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10 (concluding that "arise from or relate to"
issue is notpresented in case at hand).
62. See id. (setting forth "arise from or relate to" questions but refusing to address
them). In declining to address the "arise from or relate to" questions, the Helicopteros Court
stated as follows:
Respondents have made no argument that their cause of action either arose out of
or is related to Helicol's contacts with the state of Texas. Absent any briefing on
the issue, we decline to reach the questions (1) whether the terms "arising out of"
and "related to" describe different connections between a cause of action and a
defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie between a cause of
action and a defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that
either connection exists. Nor do we reach the question whether, if the two types of
relationship differ, a forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where
the cause of action "relates to," but does not "arise out of," the defendant's
contacts with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific jurisdiction.
Id.
63. See Richman, supra note 55, at 1339 (noting that Court's opinion in Helicopteros,
if nothing else, at least "enhanced the awareness of the issue").
64. See id. (recognizing that Court did not see fit to address specific jurisdiction questions
because parties did not argue "arise from or relate to" issue).
65. See Helicopteros Nacionaies de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with refusal of majority of Court to consider "arise from or relate
to" issue).
66.
See id. at 425 n.3 (disagreeing that parties conceded that causes of action were not related
to defendant's Texas activities).




they nonetheless are "related to" those contacts.6 Although Justice Bren-
nan's opinion sparked a fair amount of commentary, 69 the Court has not
adopted his approach. The legacy of Helicopteros is that it provided the
important first step of recognizing the "arise from or relate to" problem.
70
Apart from Helicopteros, only one other Supreme Court case has
presented the "arise from or relate to" problem. In Carnival Cruise Lines
v. Shute,71 one of the questions presented to the Court was whether a
negligence action could "arise from or relate to" the defendant's advertising
and ticket sales for Carnival Cruise Line vacations. 72 The Ninth Circuit held
that although the defendant, Carnival Cruise Lines, only conducted adver-
tising activities in plaintiff's home state of Washington, plaintiff's negligence
action for a slip and fail aboard a Carnival Cruise ship nonetheless arose
from defendant's solicitation of plaintiff's purchase of the cruise ticket.73
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit applied an expansive interpretation of
"arise from or relate to." 74 The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.75
Unfortunately, and to the surprise of followers of the case,7 6 the Court was
68. See id. (asserting that respondents' wrongful death claims were "significantly related"
to petitioners' undisputed contacts with Texas).
69. See Mayo, supra note 43, at 343-44 (calling for adoption of separate standard for
causes of action related to, but not arising from defendant's activities); Richman, supra note
55, at 1340-46 (suggesting sliding scale analysis utilizing concepts in Brennan dissent in
Helicopteros); Terez, supra note 57, at 934 n.109 (criticizing Justice Brennan's analysis in
Helicopteros); infra text accompanying notes 108-17 (discussing Justice Brennan's "relate to"
test).
70. See Richman, supra note 55, at 1339 (noting value of Helicopteros in bringing
awareness to jurisdiction problems).
71. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
72. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991) (noting that Court
granted certiorari to address constitutionality of Ninth Circuit's conclusion regarding personal
jurisdiction).
Shute involved an action for a slip and fall accident aboard one of the defendant's cruise
ships. Id. at 1524; see infra text accompanying notes 92-93 (discussing facts of Shute). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether it was proper for the courts of plaintiff's
home state of Washington to hear the plaintiff's claim. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1525. Two issues
were present. First, a forum selection clause was contained in the terms and conditions of the
plaintiff's cruise ticket naming the state of Florida as the location of any dispute resolution.
Id. Second, if the forum selection clause was invalid, as the Ninth Circuit found, there
remained the question of the propriety of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendants
in light of the tenuous nexus between the defendant's activities in the forum state and the
plaintiff's cause of action. Noting that .'[i]t is not the habit of the Court to decide questions
of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case,"' the Court
declined to address the due process personal jurisdiction question after concluding that the
forum selection clause was valid and, thus, dispositive of the case. Id. (citations omitted).
73. See Shute, III S. Ct. 1524-25 (discussing Ninth Circuit holding "that 'but for'
petitioner's solicitation of business in Washington, respondents would not have taken cruise
and Mrs. Shute would not have been injured").
74. See infra text accompanying notes 90-94 (discussing Ninth Circuit's application of
"but for" interpretation of "arise from or relate to").
75. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
76. See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 338-39 (noting surprise of followers of Shute that
Supreme Court did not address "arise from or relate to" issue).
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able to dispose of the case on other grounds and did not address the issue. 7
As a result of the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, 7 courts
have attempted to develop their own definition of "arise from or relate
to."'79 Predictably, courts have chosen different paths. 0,
III. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF "ARISE FROM OR RELATE TO"
As with much of the present day personal jurisdiction doctrine, the
"arise from or relate to" requirement originated in International Shoe.8' In
International Shoe, the Court observed that conducting activities in a state
"may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of
or are connected with the activities within the state, [requiring] the [defen-
dant] to respond to a suit brought to enforce [those obligations] can, in
most instances, hardly be said to be undue."'82 This language has evolved
into the present requirement that a cause of action must "arise from or
relate to" the defendant's activities in the forum state.8 3 To date, the courts
77. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, I11 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991) (holding that
because forum selection clause [the second of two questions certified for :review] is dispositive
of case, Court need not address constitutional question). The sales contract for the cruise
ticket contained a forum selection clause that was nbt honored by the lower courts. Id. By
validating this forum selection clause, the Supreme Court ended the controversy. Id.
78. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 37, at 736 (noting lack of guidance from academic
community as well as Supreme Court regarding proper interpretation of "arise from or relate
to" requirement).
79. See United Elec., Radio & Machine Worker's of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1080, 1089 (Ist Cir. 1992) (describing various attempts by circuits to decipher "arise from
or relate to" requirement); infra text accompanying notes 81-146 (discussing various interpre-
tations of "arise from or relate to" requirement).
80. See United Elec., 960 F.2d at 1089 (noting differing interpretations of "arise from
or relate to"); see generally Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990)
(applying broad "but for" interpretation of "arise from or relate to"), rev'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1988)
(applying "made possible by" interpretation of "arise from or relate to"); Pearrow v. National
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying strict interpretation of
"arise from or relate to" requirement).
81. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (noting that "arise from
or relate to" language originated in International Shoe).
82. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
83. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618 (reaffirming standard requiring that cause of action
"arise from or relate to" defendant's contacts with forum state); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (same); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (same); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45
(1952) (same). The "arise from or relate to" requirement has evolved from language in
International Shoe noting that activity conducted by a defendant within a state may give rise
to obligations and that personal jurisdiction in the forum state over the defendant in actions
brought to enforce these obligations does not violate due process. International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 319. Under this language, there is art argument that, because the cause of action need not
arise from the defendant's contacts but only from obligations arising from those contacts, the
true test for "arise from or relate to" should not demand a direct relationship between the
cause of action and the defendant's forum state activities. Conversely, the requirement of an
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have applied two general theories of interpretation for the "arise from or
relate to" requirement: (1) the "but for" test84 and (2) the substantive
relevance-proximate cause test.
5
A. The "But For" Test
The "but for" test is the most expansive of the various interpretations
of "arise from or relate to." 86 Some jurisdictions refer to this test as the
"made possible by" test or the "lie in the wake of" test.87 Under any
name, however, the general theory is that a cause of action "arises from
or relates to" the defendant's forum state activities when "but for" those
activities the cause of action would not have arisen.88 Therefore, if a plaintiff
can trace the chain of events leading up to the cause of action and find
that the defendant's activities contribute to this chain, the cause of action
is said to arise from those activities for the purposes of determining personal
jurisdiction.8 9
"obligation" may suggest that the contacts with the forum must have substantive significance
to the plaintiff's claim in order for the cause of action to "arise from or relate to" those
contacts.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 86-117 (discussing "but for" test).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 118-46 (discussing substantive and proximate cause
tests).
86. But see infra text accompanying notes 109-14 (recognizing "relate to" test-as most
expansive interpretation of "arise from or relate to"). The "relate to" test has not gained
significant acceptance among the courts. Of the more widely accepted interpretations of "arise
from or relate to," the "but for" test is the most expansive.
87. See Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1216 (7th Cir.
1984) (applying "lie in the wake of" test); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
466 F.2d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 1972) (applying "made possible by" test). Both the "made possible
by" test and the "lie in the wake of" test are variations of the "but for" test.
In Deluxe Ice Cream, the Seventh Circuit found jurisdiction proper when the defendant's
contacts in the forum state ultimately led to a contract which formed the basis for the cause
of action. Deluxe Ice Cream, 726 F.2d at 1215-16; see infra text accompanying notes 100-04
(discussing holding in Deluxe Ice Cream). The Sixth Circuit has stated that the required nexus
between the contacts and the cause of action is satisfied when the plaintiff's cause of action
was "made possible only by" the defendant's forum state contacts. In Flight Devices Corp.,
466 F.2d at 231.
88. See Alexander v. Circus Circus Enter., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1991)
(describing "but for" test as requiring only that relationship between cause of action and
defendant's forum contacts be such that "but for" defendant's contacts with forum state,
cause of action would not have occurred); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382-
86 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Cubbage v.
Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1984) (same). The Cubbage opinion "implies" the use
of the "but for" test and in Shute, the Ninth Circuit expressly adopts this interpretation. See
Shute, 897 F.2d at 385. The Alexander opinion is the Ninth Circuit's most recent application
of "but for."
The "but for" test is not the legal causation test applied in tort law, but a far more
deferential test. See infra text accompanying notes 123-24 (discussing distinction between "but
for" cause and legal or proximate cause).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 90-104 (describing applications of "but for" test).
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Several circuits have applied the "but for" test.90 In the Ninth Circuit
the most notable application of the "but for" test is Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines.91 In Shute the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's cause of
action for a slip and fall accident aboard the defendant's cruise ship would
not have occurred "but for" the defendant's advertising for, and sale of,
a Carnival Cruise Line ticket in the forum state. 2 Despite the defendant's
contention that the cause of action merely arose from the negligence of the
ship's crew, the court reasoned that without the defendant's forum state
activities the plaintiffs never would have boarded the defendant's cruise
ship. Therefore, in the absence of the defendant's actions, the negligence
of the ship's crew never would have affected the plaintiffs. 9 Consequently,
having found a clear "but for" relationship, the court concluded that, for
purposes of determining jurisdiction, the cause of action did arise from the
defendant's activities in the forum state.
94
The Fifth Circuit also has indicated approval of the "but for" test. In
Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc.95 the defendants argued that a tort action could
not arise from a contract with a forum state corporation. 96 The Fifth Circuit
90. See infra text accompanying notes 91-104 (discussing application of "but for" test
by Ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits).
91. 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
92. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that plaintiff's cause of action arose from defendant's forum state activities because "but for"
those contacts, plaintiff's accident aboard defendant's cruise ship would not have occurred),
rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). For a detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Carnival Cruise Lines, see Mary Lou Johnson, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction
over the Nonresident: Washington Contributes Shoe and Shute, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 243 (1991).
93. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 382-86 (holding that negligence of ship's crew could not have
affected plaintiffs if not for defendant's activities in forum state).
94. See id. (holding that cause of action did "arise from or relate to" defendant's
activities in forum state). In holding that the cause of action did "arise from or relate to"
defendant's contacts with the forum state, the court rejected the argument, which is accepted
by courts that apply a stricter interpretation of "arise from or relate to," that a tort cannot
arise from a contractual contact within the forum state. See infra text accompanying notes
131-37 (describing strict interpretation of "arise from or relate to," and noting that under
such interpretation, tort cannot arise from contract).
95. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
96. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing
defendant's argument that required nexus between cause of action and forum contacts is not
met when forum contacts are contractual and cause of action sounds in tort).
Prejean involved a wrongful death action brought by the widows of two deceased
employees of a Dallas engineering firm that allegedly contracted with defendant Sonatrach,
Inc., an Algerian oil company, to provide technical services. Id. at 1264. While performing
contractual duties in Algeria, an Algerian airliner, allegedly chartered by Sonatrach, Inc.,
crashed, killing the decedents. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas dismissed the action, finding personal jurisdiction lacking over Sonatrach and two
other defendants, Beech Aircraft Corp., the manufacturer of the aircraft, and Air Algerie, the
owner of the aircraft. Id.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal as to Beech Aircraft and Air Algerie, but reversed
as to Sonatrach and remanded for further findings of fact. Id. at 1270-71. In so holding, the
court disagreed with the argument advanced by Sonatrach that regardless of the existence of
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disagreed, stating that entering into a contract in the forum state can give
rise to a cause of action in tort when "but for" the contract, the plaintiff's
injuries could not have occurred. 97 Specifically, the court reasoned that "the
contractual contact is a 'but for' causative factor for the tort since it
brought the parties within tortious 'striking distance' of each other."9 The
court concluded that in such a situation, a cause of action in tort could
"arise from or relate to" a contractual contact with the forum state. 99
The Seventh Circuit case of Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool
Corp. °0 illustrates a more protracted application of the "but for" test. In
Deluxe Ice Cream, the plaintiff brought an action for breach of warranty. 0'
its alleged contacts with the forum state, the alleged contacts were cohtractual in nature,
whereas the plaintiff's cause of action was based in tort. Id. at 1270. Sonatrach, therefore,
argued for the conclusion that because, as a matter of substantive law, the forming of a
contract cannot formally give rise to a tort, the "arise from or relate to" requirement was
not satisfied. Id. The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed by reasoning that when the defendant's
contacts are a "but for" causative factor of the tortious injury, the "arise from or relate to"
requirement is satisfied. Id. at 1270 n.21. The court, therefore, remanded for determination
of whether Sonatrach had in fact established contractual contacts with the forum state. Id. at
1270.
Although the Prejean court dealt with the Texas long arm statute "arise from or relate
to" requirement, the holding that a "but for" relationship would be sufficient necessarily
involves due process considerations because due process must limit the interpretation of the
long arm statute. Id. at 1264.
97. See id. at 1270 (rejecting defendant's argument that action in tort cannot arise from
contract, and holding that for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, when "but for"
contractual contacts with forum state plaintiff's cause of action would not have come about,
action in tort can "arise" from contract). The court stated that defendant's interpretation of
"arise from or relate to," which would prevent a tort claim from arising from a contract,
would allow personal jurisdiction only when the forum contact, in and of itself, created the
cause of action. Id. at 1270 n.21. This interpretation, reasoned the court, ignores the plain
meaning of "arise from or relate to." Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1270 (holding that where contract puts parties within "tortious striking
distance" of one another, contractual contacts with forum state can give rise to cause of
action in tort).
100. 726 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1984)
101. See Deluxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir.
1984) (analyzing plaintiff's cause of action).
Deluxe Ice Cream involved an action for breech of warranty. The defendant Sumner H.
Bates was the sole shareholder of a Netherlands corporation engaged in the business of locating
purchasers of ice cream making equipment. Id. at 1210-11. Bates located plaintiff, Deluxe Ice
Cream Company, and pursued discussions relating to the purchase of ice cream equipment
from SMW Packaging Corporation. Id. at 1211. Some of these discussions took place in the
forum state. Id. SMW and Deluxe Ice Cream ultimately executed a contract for the purchase
of the equipment and, following Deluxe Ice Cream's dissatisfaction, a breach of warranty
action was instituted against SMW and Bates. Id. at 1211-12. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the action against Bates for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 1212.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court reversed the dismissal, finding personal
jurisdiction proper over Bates. In so holding, the court reasoned that "the discussions that
took place in Illinois between [plaintiff] and Bates played a part in the subsequent negotiations
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The Seventh Circuit held that the contract between the plaintiff and a third
party that formed the basis for the cause of action would not have occurred
"but for" certain negotiations in the forum state between the defendant
and plaintiff.1°2 In so holding, the court reasoned that the contract creating
the warranty "lies in the wake" of the defendant's activities in the forum
state. 03 Thus, the court concluded that the cause of action did "arise from
or relate to" the defendant's contacts with the forum state.'
4
The theme advanced by the circuits applying the "but for" test is that
the immediate cause of the plaintiff's cause of action is only the starting
point for the determination of personal jurisdiction. 0 s The "but. for"
jurisdictions will look to the "cause of the cause" and beyond to determine
whether the suit "arises from" the defendant's activities in the forum
state. 10 Although the "but for" test has failed to command unanimous
acceptance of the courts, an expansive interpretation of "arise from or
relate to" has gained approval from at least one justice of the Supreme
Court. 07
Justice Brennan's dissent in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall called for the Court to adopt a standard that would recognize the
"relate to" language of the "arise from or relate to" requirement. 08 Indeed,
Justice Brennan's Helicopteros dissent may have called for a standard even
more expansive than "but for."'19 His dissent never discussed a threshold
of causal relatedness, but only distinguished, and would hold sufficient,
contacts that "formally 'give rise' to the cause of action and contacts that
between Bates and the plaintiff, which led to the contract between SMW and the plaintiff."
Id. at 1215-16. Thus, the court concluded that the contract forming the basis of the cause of
action "lies in the wake of" Bates's contacts with the forum state; therefore, Bates contacts
sufficiently "gave rise" to the cause of action. Id. at 1216.
102. See id. at 1215-16 (finding "arise from or relate to" relationship). The Court held
that the contract from which the cause of action arose would not have arisen "but for" the
defendant's discussions and negotiations with a "middle man" to the transaction. Id.
103. Id. at 1216.
104. See id. (concluding that because contract forming basis for cause of action "lies in
the wake" of defendant's forum activities, cause of action did "arise from or relate to" those
activities).
105. See Alexander v. Circus Circus Enter., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1991)
(implying that courts should not limit their analysis to immediate "cause" of cause of action;
rather, courts should consider "entire course of events" leading up to plaintiff's cause of
action).
106. See id.
107. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (supporting broad interpretation of "arise from or relate to").
108. See id. at 424-28 (arguing in favor of interpretation of "arise from or relate to"
that recognizes distinction between causes of action "arising from" and causes of action
"relating to" defendant's contacts with forum state). Note that the Helicopteros majority
concluded, and Justice Brennan disagreed, that the parties had conceded that the cause of
action was unrelated to the defendant's contacts. Id. at 415.
109. See id. at 424-28 (avoiding explicit definition of sufficient relationship between
plaintiff's action and defendant's contacts under "relate to" analysis).
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are "related to" the cause of action." 0 Although it appears from Justice
Brennan's dissent that he found that "formally arise out of" means more
than "but for," it is not clear whether his "related to" test requires at
least a "but for" relationship."' One commentator has noted that a "related
to" approach potentially could encompass two types of relationships: a
"but for" relationship, and a "similarity" relationship." 2 The similarity
relationship, which is the most expansive possible interpretation, would
allow jurisdiction in any state where the defendant has engaged in activity
similar to that which caused the plaintiff's injury."' Could Justice Brennan
have intended such an approach?"
4
Regardless of the particular semantics of the term "relate to,"
Justice Brennan clearly would have at least supported a "but for" test, and
possibly would have called for an even more expansive test."' Critics of the
"but for" test would quickly point out, however, that Justice Brennan's
opinions on personal jurisdiction often have conflicted with the main-
stream."16 Nonetheless, the majority of the Court in Helicopteros did not
110. See id. (distinguishing between causes of action "formally arising from" and causes
of action merely "related to" defendant's contacts with forum state). Justice Brennan argued
that there is a difference between the two relationships and that both are sufficient for specific
jurisdiction. Id. at 425.
111. See id. (indicating that "arise from" means more than "but for," but avoiding
defining "relate to"). It appears that Justice Brennan's interpretation of "arising from"
requires a substantively relevant contact because he concedes that the cause of action in
Helicopteros did not "formally arise from" the defendant's contacts with Texas. Id. Alter-
natively, although the facts of Helicopteros do indicate a "but for" relationship between the
defendant's Texas contacts and the cause of action, Justice Brennan does not explicitly state
that "but for" is the minimum sufficient relationship for his "relate to" analysis. Id. at 425-
28.
112. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Su'. CT. Rav. 77, 83 (noting that there are two reasons for characterizing
defendant's forum activity as "related" to cause of action). Brilmayer refers to the California
Supreme Court case of Cornelison v. Chaney, 545 P.2d 264 (Cal. 1976). Id. In that case, as
in Justice Brennan's dissent in Helicopteros, the court relied on a "relate to" analysis without
explicitly defining the necessary relationship.
113. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 84 (stating that if "relate to" analysis permitted
mere similarity between defendant's acts and those acts leading to cause of action, jurisdiction
would be proper in any state wherein defendant engaged in such similar acts). Brilmayer
illustrates the flexibility of a "similarity" standard by suggesting that in a cause of action
arising from an automobile accident, the defendant could be sued in any state where she had
previously driven. Id.
114. See Mayo, supra note 43, at 344 (suggesting adoption of "relate to" test). This
approach, like Justice Brennan's dissent in Helicopteros, does not define the necessary rela-
tionship for the "relate to" analysis; however, the author expressly recommends that no
specific parameters govern the application of "relate to." Id. at 360-61.
115. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 83 (identifying two possible interpretations of
"relate to"). Of the two possible interpretations of "relate to," "but for" is the narrower
meaning. Justice Brennan's call for a "relate to" test, therefore, necessarily indicates his
approval of at least a "but for" interpretation.
116. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding
assertion of personal jurisdiction proper despite majority holding that personal jurisdiction
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1265
necessarily disagree with Justice Brennan's "relate to" analysis, but held
only that the issue was not before the Court." 7 Justice Brennan's dissent,
therefore, is significant to proponents of "but for" in that it represents the
only explicit pronouncement by a member of the Colirt regarding the "arise
from or relate to" issue.
B. The Substantive-Proximate Cause Test
In sharp contrast to the "but for" test, the substantive relevance test
applies a very strict interpretation of "arise from or relate to." Under this
test, for a cause of action to "arise from or relate to" a defendant's
contacts with the forum state, the contacts must have substantive relevance
to the cause of action."8 More plainly, the forum contacts must be necessary
to the proof of the cause of action. " 9 Consequently, the substantive relevance
test denies jurisdiction in many instances in which the "but for" test would
allow personal jurisdiction. 20
Some courts have applied the substantive relevance interpretation of
"arise from or relate to" under the name of the "proximate cause" test.' 2'
This test analogizes the "arise from or relate to" requirement to the binary
was lacking); World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (same); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(same). Justice Brennan filed a joint dissenting opinion for Rush and World Wide Volkswagen.
117. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hail, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (holding
by majority that parties have stipulated that claims did not "arise from or relate to" defendant's
contacts with state of Texas). Because the majority declined to address the "relate to" issue,
the opinion is not in disagreement with Justice Brennan's interpretation of that phrase, but
only in disagreement that the determination of the meaning of "related to" is necessary to
the disposition of the case.
118. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 82 (stating that cause of action does not arise
from forum contacts unless that contact "is the geographical qualification of a fact relevant
to the merits").
119. See Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that forum
contacts must constitute "a material element of proof" for cause of action to "arise from or
relate to" those contacts); Standard Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Western Fin., 436 F. Supp.
843, 846 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (noting that acts offered as proof of personal jurisdiction must
be same acts offered as proof of cause of action). The Standard Life court interpreted a
provision of an Oklahoma long arm statute. Id. However, the court noted that the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma had construed its long arm statute as extending personal jurisdiction to
the limits of federal due process. Id. The issue, therefore, required a judgment of the limits
of due process. Id.
120. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 383 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that
under facts of Shute, jurisdiction would not be proper if court applied "arise from" test set
forth in Marino v. Hyatt Corp.), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). The Shute
court affirmatively disagreed with the substantive relevance test set forth in Marino, and
explicitly stated that the "but for" and substantive relevance tests would yield opposite results
on the same factual situation. Id.
121. See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1259 (1st Cir. 1990) (suggesting
use of proximate cause test for "arise from or relate to" requirement); see also Shute, 897
F.2d at 385 (referring to the restrictive interpretations of "arise from or relate to" set forth
in Marino as "the proximate cause approach").
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proximate cause requirement in tort law. 122 Proximate cause requires that a
contact not only have a "but for" relationship to the cause of action, but
also that the contact be the legal or "proximate" cause of the injury.' 3
For an event to be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury generally
must be a foreseeable consequence of that event.'2 If a contact is the
proximate or legal cause of an injury, then it is substantively relevant to a
cause of action arising from that injury.' 5 Consequently, the substantive
relevance test and the proximate cause test are essentially the same. For
simplicity, the substantive relevance and proximate cause tests are referred
to hereinafter as the substantive test.
Several circuits have applied the substantive test.126 In Pizarro v. Hoteles
Concorde International,27 the First Circuit analyzed a case bearing strong
factual similarity to Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines.28 In Pizarro the court
ruled that a negligence action for injuries occurring in defendant's Aruba
hotel could not "arise from" the defendant's solicitation of tourist reser-
vations in the forum state. 29 In so holding, the court implied that, at a
122. See Pizarro, 907 F.2d at 1259 (suggesting analogy between "arise from or relate to"
requirement and binary test for legal causation in tort law).
123. See id. (noting that legal causation in tort requires two-pronged analysis). For an
event to be the legal cause of injury, it is insufficient to show only that "but for" the event,
the injury would not have occurred. Id. A "but for" relationship, which is sufficient for
personal jurisdiction in courts applying the "but for" test, is only the first requirement for
legal causation. Id. The second requirement is met only when the event is also the proximate
or foreseeable cause of the injury. Id. at 1259-60.
124. See id. (recognizing that foreseeability is "touchstone" of legal causation); WILLIAM
L. PROSSER ET AL.., Tai LAW OF TORTS 280 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that accepted view of
proximate cause requires foreseeability).
125. See PROSSER, supra note 124, at 164-65 (recognizing that proximate cause is one of
four elements to cause of action in tort). By definition, proximate cause means the legal cause
of the injury. If, therefore, a contact with the forum constitutes the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, it must be "substantively relevant" to the cause of action.
126. See United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1080, 1089-90 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying strict substantive relevance or proximate cause
interpretation of "arise from or relate to"); Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281
(8th Cir. 1991) (same); Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (1st Cir.
1990) (same); Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 429-30 (Ist Cir. 1986) (same); Pearrow
v. National Life Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Gelfand v. Tanner
Motor Tours, 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1964) (same).
127. 907 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1990).
128. Compare Pizarro, 907 F.2d 1256 (1st Cir. 1990) (analyzing plaintiff's claim that
negligence action for slip and fall in defendant's hotel "arose from" defendant's solicitation
of business in forum state) with Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990)
(analyzing plaintiff's claim that negligence action for slip and fall aboard defendant's cruise
ship "arose from" defendant's solicitation of business in forum state), rev'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
129. See Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
that negligence action did not arise from defendant's solicitation of business in forum state).
Pizarro involved a negligence action for personal injury sustained by plaintiff Ivette
Ramos, a citizen of Puerto Rico, in an accident occurring at the defendant Aruba Concorde
Hotel. rd. at 1258. The action was brought in the United States District Court for the District
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minimum, a contact should constitute a legal or proximate cause of an
injury for a cause of action to "arise from" that contact. 30 Therefore, the
Pizarro court clearly applied the substantive test interpretation of "arise
from or relate to."
The Second Circuit case of Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours' offers
another example of the substantive test. In Gelfand the court relied on an
argument, rejected by the "but for" jurisdictions, 3 2 that a tort cannot arise
from a contract.'33 The court reasoned that obligations under tort law "are
of Puerto Rico where the court granted Concorde's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the Aruban defendant. Id. In so holding, the court noted that Concorde's
only contacts with Puerto Rico were advertisements in Puerto Rican newspapers and concluded
that the plaintiff's injuries did not, as required by the Puerto Rican long arm statute, "arise
out of or result from" these limited contacts with Puerto Rico defendant's contacts. Id. The
court, therefore, rejected the plaintiff's argument that it was only because of the defendant's
advertisements in Puerto Rico that she visited the hotel and, thus, was injured there. Id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the opinion
of the district court. Id. at 1260. In so holding, the court noted an earlier case, Marino v.
Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 472 (Ist Cir. 1986), wherein very similar facts were found insufficient
to demonstrate that the plaintiff's cause of action "arose from" the defendant's contacts with
the forum state. Pizarro, 907 F.2d at 1259. The Marino court statedi that the granting of
personal jurisdiction in such tenuous cases would render the "arise from" requirement a
"nullity." Id. In determining whether events "arise from" the defendant's forum state contacts,
the Pizarro court suggested an analogy between the "arise from" requirement and the
requirement of legal causation or proximate cause in tort law. Id. Finding no such nexus in
the present case, the court concluded that personal jurisdiction over Concorde in Puerto Rico
was improper. Id. at 1260.
Although the First Circuit's opinion was primarily concerned with the "arise from"
requirement in the Puerto Rican long arm statute, the case, nonetheless, represents an evaluation
of the due process "arise from" requirement because the court stated that personal jurisdiction,
regardless of the long arm statute, would violate due process. Id.
130. See Pizarro, 907 F.2d at 1259-60 (ruling that defendant's contacts with forum state
did not constitute proximate or legal cause of injury; therefore, defendant's contacts were
insufficient). The court construed a provision of the Puerto Rican long arm statute requiring
that causes of action "arise from" the defendant's contacts with the state. Id. at 1258. The
court, however, determined that the long arm statute required that "the activity linking
defendant, forum and cause of action must be substantial enough to meet due process
requirements of 'fair play and substantial justice."' Id. The issue, therefore, required a
determination of the requirements of federal due process, thus, the determination of the proper
interpretation of the "arise from or relate to" requirement.
131. 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing fact that "but for" courts reject
argument that action in tort cannot arise from defendant's contractual contacts with forum
state).
133. See Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
that plaintiffs cause of action in tort could not have arisen from contract because law of
tort, rather than law of contract, imposes obligations which plaintiff alleged defendant
breached).
Gelfand involved an action for personal injury brought by the Gelfands, husband and
wife, for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle crash while aboard one of defendant's tour
buses. Id. at 318. The plaintiff's purchased their bus tickets from the defendant, Tanner Motor
Tours, through an independent travel bureau in New York, the forum state. Id. at 321. The
Second Circuit rejected the argument that this sale could establish the basis for personal
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creations of the law implicit in the parties' relationship to each other rather
than express undertakings [in a contract]. 13 4 The court's holding indicates
that because a contract does not create the obligation or duty from which
the cause of action accrues, a contract cannot give rise to the cause of
action.' 3 The Gelfand opinion, therefore, rejects the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit in Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc.'36 that a contract can give rise to a
cause of action in tort when that contract brings the parties within "tortious
striking distance" of one another.
3 7
Despite the restrictive nature of the substantive test, some proponents
of the substantive test have suggested that this is the approach the Supreme
Court is most likely to adopt. 3 ' These commentators point to the language
of the 1980 Supreme Court case of Rush v. Savchuk39 and argue that it
"strongly supports the substantive relevance test."'40 Rush involved an action
for personal injuries arising from an automobile accident in Indiana.' 4' The
plaintiff sued in Minnesota, claiming that jurisdiction was proper because
the defendant's insurance company did business in Minnesota. 42 The Court
rejected this argument, concluding that only the insurance company, not
the defendant, had a contact with Minnesota and that the insurance policy
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. The court held that, even assuming the sale of the bus
tickets constituted a contact by the defendant with New York, the cause of action did not
"arise from" this sale. Id. In so holding, the court relied in part on the theory that a tort
cannot formally arise from contractual contacts such as the sale of bus tickets. Id. at 321-22.
The court, however, went on to state that even an action for personal injuries based on breach
of contract would fail because the "gist" of the claim is still in tort. Id. at 322.
134. Id.
135. See id. (concluding that contract did not give rise to tort action). Note that the
Gelfand court went so far as to say that an action sounding in contract (for breach of contract
of safe carriage) would fail because the "gist" of such a claim is in tort. Id. This reasoning
is in direct conflict with a holding in the Sixth Circuit that stated:
[When] a tort action has its roots in a commercial relationship between businessmen,
and where the cause of action relates to commercial aspects of that transaction,
jurisdiction may be predicated upon the defendant's transaction of business within
the state, regardless of whether the action technically sounds in contract or tort.
In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 231 (6th Cir. 1972).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing Fifth Circuit's argument that
action in tort can arise from contract when contract puts parties within "tortious striking
distance" of one another).
137. Compare Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 n.21 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that cause of action in tort can arise from contract) with Gelfand, 339 F.2d at 322
(holding that contract cannot give rise to action in tort).
138. See Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. Rev.
1444, 1463 (1988) (supporting substantive test by noting that it is consistent with previous
holdings of Supreme Court); Brilmayer, supra note 112, at '100 (same); Robert L. Theriot,
Note, Specific and General Jurisdiction-The Reshuffling of Minimum Contacts Analysis, 59
Tin.. L. REv. 826, 840 (1985) (same).
139. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
140. Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 100.
141. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980).
142. Id. at 328.
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"was not related to the operative facts of the litigation."' 41 Proponents of
the substantive test contend that this language indicates the Court's incli-
nation toward a standard of substantive relevance. 44 Presumably, the as-
sumption is that the "operative facts of the litigation" include only
substantively relevant facts. 45 The holding in Rush, however, cannot be
conclusive evidence of the Court's intent. In that case, the alleged contact
with the forum state, even assuming the Court had attributed it to the
defendant, did not demonstrate even a "but for" relationship to the cause
of action.' 46 The Court appears to require a stronger relationship than that
present in Rush, but where the Court will draw the line remains a question.
IV. MAKING A CHOICE
A. Arguments for and Against the "But For" Test
The Ninth Circuit, perhaps the strongest proponent of the "but for"
test, has advanced .several arguments in support of this expansive interpre-
tation. 47 First, the words "arise from or relate to," (by definition) arguably
imply an expansive test for the connection between the cause of action and
the forum contacts.' 41 Requiring more than a "but for" relationship "un-
necessarily limits the ordinary meaning of ['arise from or relate to'].' 49
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's textual argument is supported by the fact that
the Supreme Court has neglected to clarify or narrow the "arise from or
relate to" language. 50 As a consequence, the argument is reasonable that
143. Id. at 329. The Rush Court first concluded that the alleged contact with the forum
state was not attributable to the defendant because there was no purposeful activity by the
defendant directed to the forum state. Id. The Court then held that the alleged contact was
not related to the "operative facts" of the case. Id.
144. See supra notes 138-40 (contending that Rush offers support for substantive test).
145. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 329 (requiring contacts that are "operative facts of the
litigation"). It is unclear what the Rush Court meant when it referred t6 the "operative facts
of the litigation." Id. If this language is to have any value to proponents of the substantive
test, it must be assumed that the Rush court meant "substantively relevant facts of the
litigation."
146. See id. at 322 (reading of facts indicates absence of "but for" relationship). In Rush,
if the alleged contact with the forum state, the insurance policy, had never existed, the accident
leading to the cause of action would still have occurred. Consequently, the holding in Rush
would have been the same if the Court had expressly applied the "but for" test. Because the
Court did not identify the necessary relationship between the contact and cause of action, the
holding only suggests that the Court will require a stronger relationship than that presented
in Rush.
147. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th 'Cir. 1990) (advancing
arguments in favor of "but for" test for "arise from or relate to" requirement), rev'd on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); see also Johnson, supra note 92 at 249 (outlining
various arguments advanced by Ninth Circuit in Shute supporting adoption of "but for" test).
148. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 385-86 (reasoning that plain meaning of "arise from or relate
to" suggests liberal nexus requirement between cause of action and forum contacts).
149. Id. at 385.
150. See supra note 45 (explaining that there is little guidance from either academic
commentary or Supreme Court as to proper interpretation of "arise from or relate to").
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courts should not restrict the ordinary meaning of "arise from or relate
to" without further guidance from the Supreme Court.'
The Ninth Circuit also has argued that the basic function of the "arise
from or relate to" requirement is to maintain the distinction between specific
and general personal jurisdiction.5 2 That court insists that the "but for"
test fulfills this essential function by refusing the application of specific
personal jurisdiction when there is no discernable nexus between the cause
of action and the defendant's activities in the forum state.'53 In such a case,
a plaintiff would have to satisfy the general jurisdiction requirements by
showing that the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with the
forum state.'
54
Another argument in favor of the "but for" test is that only with an
expansive interpretation of "arise from or relate to" can a court achieve a
fair result in cases in which, for instance, a defendant has numerous, but
not "continuous and systematic," contacts with the forum state, but the
cause of action bears a tenuous relationship to those contacts. s5 The
application of a stricter test, the Ninth Circuit argues, would permit a
defendant to engage in substantial activities in the forum state, yet escape
forum jurisdiction with respect to tenuously related claims. 56 The "but for"
151. See Helicopteros de Nacionales de Coiom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 424-28 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that restrictive interpretation of "arise from or relate to" is
inconsistent with plain meaning of words).
152. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
basic purpose of "arise from or relate to" requirement is to maintain distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
153. See id. (offering proof that "but for" test maintains distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction). The court in Shute insisted that it would not exercise adjudicatory
authority over causes of action truly unrelated to defendant's contacts in the forum stating:
Under this test, a defendant cannot be haled into court for activities unrelated to
the cause of action in the absence of a showing of substantial and continuous
contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. Breeland, 792
F.2d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 1986) (an assault on a flight attendant occurring in a plane
on the ground in Reno does not arise out of a defendant's musical performances or
sales of records or tapes in California); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional
de Production, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) (visits to California by a
defendant's representatives to execute formal documents in prior transactions do not
support the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause of action relating to subsequent,
unrelated transactions). The "but for" test preserves the requirement that there be
some nexus between the cause of action and the defendant's activities in the forum.
Id.
154. See id. (stating that court will sustain personal jurisdiction over cause of action with
no relationship to defendant's forum contacts only upon showing of contacts necessary for
general jurisdiction).
155. See id. (noting that cases involving substantial contacts with forum state but only
tenuous relationship between cause of action and forum contacts may require "but for"
interpretation of "arise from or relate to" in order to achieve fair result).
156. See id. at 386 (noting potential unfairness of applying strict interpretation of "arise
from or relate to"). The Shute court suggested that allowing a defendant with substantial
contacts to avoid the forum's jurisdiction on tenuously related claims may represent "an
unwarranted departure from the core concepts of 'fair play and substantial justice."' Id.
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test, however, would permit jurisdiction over tenuously related claims when
the circumstances as a whole suggest it would be reasonable to do so.1
7
A major criticism of the "but for" test is that by allowing a court to
examine the entire history of events leading up to the cause of action, the
"but for" test allows almost unlimited jurisdiction.' Professor Lea Brilmayer,
a critic of the "but for" test, has voiced serious concerns over the seemingly
unlimited jurisdiction offered by the "but for" interpretation.'59 Brilmayer
illustrates this concern with a hypothetical. She gives the example of a New
York citizen driving from Connecticut to Maine by way of ;Massachusetts. 60
If the New York citizen injures a pedestrian in an automobile accident in
Massachusetts, she argues that under the "but for" test jurisdiction would
be proper in both Connecticut and Maine in an action by the pedestrian.'6'
This conclusion, although potentially correct using an absolute interpretation
of a "but for" relationship, ignores the practical restraint placed on the "but
for" test by the courts applying it.162
The Ninth Circuit has addressed the concerns of critics such as Brilmayer,
noting that cases that are "too attenuated" would fail the "reasonableness"
standard for personal jurisdiction.161 The "but for" interpretation, therefore,
157. See id. (stating that "reasonableness" prong of personal jurisdiction analysis will
prevent exercise of jurisdiction over claims that are too tenuously related to defendant's
contacts with forum).
158. See Terez, supra note 57, at 941-42 (stating that "but for" test would allow
jurisdiction in cases not meeting requirements of fair play and substantial justice required by
due process). A major concern with an expansive interpretation of "arise from or relate to"
is that it would increase the number of potential forums for litigation, thus, increase plaintiffs'
choice-of-law options. A strict interpretation, therefore, would limit a plaintiff's ability to
"forum shop" for the most advantageous state law. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 653
(noting forum shopping problem).
159. See Brilmayer, supra note 138, at 1462 (criticizing "but for" as being too expansive);
Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 84 (same). Brilmayer notes that one's own'birth is a "but for"
causative factor of everything that individual does in his or her lifetime. Brilmayer, supra note
138, at 1462.
160. See Brilmayer, supra note 138, at 1445 (setting forth hypothetical illustration for
determining scope of "but for" test).
161. Id. at 1458 (arguing that, under "but for," jurisdiction would be proper in state
traveled through, as well as state of destination).
162. Technically, Brilmayer is correct in her assessment that "but for" passing through
the state of Connecticut, and "but for" the defendant's trip toward Maine the accident in
Massachusetts would not have occurred. Id. As a practical matter, however, a court would
still require a showing that the defendant had purposely availed contacts with the forum state.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 (discussing purposeful availment requirement). This
consideration may render jurisdiction improper in Maine, a state where, according to Bril-
mayer's facts, the defendant may have no contacts at all. See Brilmayer, supra note 138, at
1445 (setting forth facts of hypothetical). Moreover, Brilmayer's conclusion does not consider
the impact of a "reasonableness" analysis of the facts as a whole, which could also render
jurisdiction inappropriate. See infra text accompanying notes 223-30 (discussing "reasonable-
ness" analysis utilized in Ninth Circuit and potential modifications).
163. See Alexander v. Circus Circus Enter., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1991)
(setting forth Ninth Circuit's three-pronged test for personal jurisdiction, third prong being
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is not a bright line test as applied. A "but for" relationship, standing alone,
is insufficient for personal jurisdiction. There must also exist, according to
the Ninth Circuit, accompanying factors of reasonableness for a court to
assert personal jurisdiction.'6
Policing the "but for" test with a "reasonableness" analysis, as the
Ninth Circuit suggests,' 65 will help alleviate the concerns with the "but for"
test if courts will step up the now highly deferential "reasonableness"
scrutiny. 6 6 In practice, courts may find it difficult to depart from the accepted
method of presuming reasonableness upon a showing of minimum contacts.
Even the Ninth Circuit in one of its most recent applications of the "but
for" test stated that "[o]nce purposeful availment has been established, the
forum's exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable."' 67 In the usual
case, a court conducts the "reasonableness" analysis only after a showing of
minimum contacts.'16 In "but for" cases, however, the "reasonableness"
analysis must contribute to the determination of whether minimum contacts
exist. 69 Consequently, a deferential "reasonableness" analysis would not
effectively safeguard the requirements of due process.
"reasonableness"); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
that "reasonableness" requirement would prevent assertion of jurisdiction where defendant's
contacts are "too attenuated"), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). But see infra
text accompanying notes 165-69 (discussing problem of policing "but for" test with "reason-
ableness" analysis in light of tendency among courts to engage in highly deferential test for
reasonableness).
164. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 385 (requiring assertion of jurisdiction to be reasonable,
noting that this requirement will prevent jurisdiction over claims with relationship to defendant's
contacts that is "too attenuated").
165. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64 (discussing Ninth Circuit's suggestion that
"reasonableness" prong of personal jurisdiction analysis will prevent abuse of "but for" test).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (discussing deferential application of "rea-
sonableness" standard after finding of minimum contacts).
167. Alexander, 939 F.2d at 854.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15 (noting that "reasonableness" inquiry is
final prong of personal jurisdiction analysis).
169. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
smaller number of contacts with forum would require stronger nexus between cause of action
and forum contacts), rev'd on other grounds, Lll S. Ct. 1522 (1991). By examining such
factors as the number of the defendant's additional, unrelated contacts with the forum, the
Ninth Circuit is actually engaging in a "reasonableness" determination for the use of the "but
for" test. Some commentators would suggest that such an approach dilutes the distinction
between specific and general jurisdiction. See Richman, supra note 55, at 1339 (noting that
some commentators maintain that personal jurisdiction is inappropriate when based on mixed
consideration of related and unrelated contacts) (citing EUGENE F. ScoLas & P=TER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8.31 (1982) and Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 80-88). But see Shute, 897
F.2d at 385 (insisting that "but for" test maintains distinction between specific and general
personal jurisdiction analysis). The Ninth Circuit's approach can be likened to the so called
"sliding scale" approach to personal jurisdiction. See Richman, supra note 55, at 1336-46
(describing and endorsing "sliding scale" analysis); infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text
(describing how adoption of "but for" test will allow "sliding scale" analysis without disrupting
structure of present general and specific jurisdictional models).
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B. Arguments for and Against the Substantive Test
As the most restrictive interpretation of "arise from or relate to," the
substantive test has several positive features that are the loIgical products of
a strict standard. 70 One redeeming quality of the substantive relevance test
is its clarity.'7 ' As is usually the case with rigid standards, the substantive
relevance test is simple because its application has no "grey area."' If the
contact is not substantively relevant, it cannot count as a consequential
contact for specific personal jurisdiction.7  Another result of the rigidity of
the substantive test is alleviation of the "forum shopping" problems associated
with the "but for" test. 174 With a restricted number of available forums, the
potential for forum shopping by plaintiffs decreases.175 Furthermore, if courts
exercise specific jurisdiction only on a showing of substantively relevant
contacts, defendants can be assured that unless they engage in such activity,
they will not subject themselves to a foreign state's adjudicatory authority. 176
Another argument in favor of the substantive test is set forth by Professor
Brilmayer. 177 According to Brilmayer, the true basis for a court's assertion
of specific jurisdiction is to exercise regulatory authority over activity con-
ducted in the state. 78 Based on this assumption, she argues that contacts
forming a substantively relevant part of a cause of action are the only contacts
that a court may consider in order to exercise regulatory authority. 179 Indeed,
in suits not involving a jurisdiction dispute, nonsubstantively related contacts
have no significance.8 0 Nonsubstantively relevant contacts, Brilmayer argues,
170. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 653 (noting that substantive test has advantages:
clarity, deterrence of forum shopping, and notice to defendants).
171. See id. (recognizing that substantive test creates "bright line" for determining
propriety of specific personal jurisdiction).
172. See id. (stating that substantive test avoids difficulties associated with analyzing
"fairness" by establishing "bright line" test that provides definitive answer to question of
whether cause of action "arises from or relates to" defendant's forum contacts). The fact that
the substantive test is a "bright line" test distinguishes this test from the "but for" test. See
supra text accompanying notes 163-64 (discussing that "but for" test is not "black and white"
test).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 126-37 (discussing application of substantive test).
174. See supra note 158 (discussing forum shopping problems associated with "but for"
test).
175. See supra note 158 (stating that substantive test would limit forum shopping).
176. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 653 (noting that substantive test gives defendants
"minimum notice of the applicable substantive law").
177. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 82-86 (arguing for substantive test).
178. See id. at 86 (stating that "the most convincing justification [for requiring defendant
to litigate cause of action in foreign state] is the state's right to regulate activities occurring
within state").
179. See id. (arguing that only substantively related contacts receive consideration by
courts in determining specific personal jurisdiction). Brilmayer reasons that courts need not
concern themselves with nonsubstantively related contacts because the court's regulatory
authority is not called upon unless the defendant has engaged in forum state activity that is
substantively relevant to a cause of action in the forum state. Id.
180. See infra note 181 (noting inequity of considering nonsubstantively related contacts
only because jurisdiction is at issue).
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do not necessitate or attract a court's regulatory authority in cases in which
jurisdiction is not an issue; thus, nonsubstantively related contacts should not
gain significance simply because jurisdiction is at issue. 8' Brilmayer concludes,
therefore, that the substantive test is the fairest and most logical interpretation
of "arise from or relate to."''
Apart from claiming that the substantive test is simply too restrictive,'
critics of the test have noted that, despite the apparent ease of application,
the substantive test may be quite difficult to administer.'" This difficulty is
most evident in the close cases in which the necessity for a decisive standard
for "arise from or relate to" is most apparent. 8 5 The difficulty exists in
determining what constitutes a "substantively relevant" contact. In close
cases, this may involve a determination of what constitutes a "proximate
cause" of the injury leading to the cause of action. 8 6 Consequently, in
deciding the preliminary question of personal jurisdiction, a court may find
it necessary to pass judgment on the ultimate issue of the merits of the case,
that is, whether the defendant's actions were the legal or "proximate" cause
of the plaintiff's injuries.' w In light of this potential problem, it appears that
181. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 82-83, 86 (arguing that giving significance to
nonsubstantively related contacts is unfair to defendant). Relying on the assumption that the
basis for asserting jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is the state's regulatory authority,
Brilmayer suggests that the consideration of nonsubstantively relevant contacts is unfair to the
defendant because, in doing so, a court gives weight to conduct having no regulatory significance
only because jurisdiction is at issue. Id. at 86. Brilmayer goes so far as to state, "[it would
be arbitrary, and thus a violation of due process if the court merely seized on the [nonsub-
stantively relevant] contact ... as a pretext for jurisdiction." Id.
182. See id. at 82 (stating that using substantive relevance to determine whether cause of
action "arises from or relates to" defendant's contacts is "a natural test").
183. See Helicopteros Nacionaes de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419-20 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that limiting application of "arise from or relate to" to causes of
action formally arising from defendant's contacts, i.e., substantive test, is too restrictive);
Alexander v. Circus Circus Enter., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd on other grounds,
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Twitchell, supra note 28, at 653-54 (same).
184. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 656-57 (noting potential difficulty in determining
when contacts are substantively relevant to cause of action).
185. See id. at 656 (stating that difficulty in determining substantive relevance is partic-
ularly troublesome in tenuously related claims).
186. See id. (suggesting that it is not always clear which contacts have substantive relevance
to cause of action). In tenuously related claims, the question of jurisdiction could turn on
whether the defendant's activity in the forum was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. Id.
at 65657. This requires a determination of "proximate cause," an is'sue that many law students
and professors agree is among the most perplexing issues to determine. See PROSSER, supra
note 124, at 280 (stating that "[t]here is perhaps no other issue in the law of torts over which
so much controversy has raged" than what constitutes proximate cause).
187. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 657 (noting that courts, in tenuously related cases,
cannot readily answer questions of jurisdiction because determining of substantive relevance is
not clear). It is not hard to imagine a case wherein the very claim of innocence by the
defendant is that her actions were not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This is the
defendant's defense on the merits. This same defense to the merits will be the defense to
jurisdiction under the substantive test. Thus, a court will have to make a decision on the
merits at the jurisdiction stage. In jury trials, this could be particularly troublesome.
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the substantive test is "simple" only in the sense that it provides an absolute,
bright line test. 88 Nonetheless, serious difficulty may arise in determining on
which side of the "bright line" a particular case falls.
C. The Policy Behind the Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine and a Decision
Based on Fairness
Even assuming, however, that the substantive test is in fact easier to
administer than the "but for" test, this benefit alone would not justify the
adoption of the substantive test. The need for administrative efficiency should
not govern the limits of due process.18 9 If administrative ease were determi-
native, the Supreme Court likely would have chosen not to depart froni the
simplistic territoriality rule of Pennoyer v. Neff.190 The critical inquiry in
determining the most appropriate standard for "arise from or relate to"
involves an examination of each test's basis within the personal jurisdiction
doctrine set forth by International Shoe and its progeny.19'
An examination of the relative benefits and drawbacks associated with
the adoption of either interpretation of "arise form or relate to" reveals that
neither test provides a perfect standard. 192 The fundamental criticisms are that
"but for" is too broad and the substantive test is too narrow. The analysis,
therefore, must shift to a determination of which test best fulfills the
underlying justification for distinguishing between related and unrelated con-
tacts.'13
Professor Brilmayer has argued that the justification for the limitations
on specific jurisdiction rests on the concept of state sovereignty.' 94 Under this
188. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (describing substantive test as rigid,
bright line test). It is not denied that the substantive test is, indeed, simple to apply once it
is clear that a defendant's contacts are or are not substantively relevant. In contrast to the
"but for" test, the substantive test is complete when a determination on substantive relevance
is made. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64 (noting that "but for" is not bright line
test).
189. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (indicating that
test for personal jurisdiction should not be mechanical). The Court's emphasis on a case by
case analysis of the particular facts supporting personal jurisdiction clearly suggests that
administrative ease was not a consideration in the Court's determination of the proper test
for personal jurisdiction.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (describing rigid, yet administratively simple
territorial rule of Pennoyer). When the Supreme Court departed from Pennoyer in International
Shoe, it obviously made a choice in favor of flexibility over administrative convenience.
191. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 (1982) (clarifying that test for personal jurisdiction is based on International Shoe and
its progeny).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 147-88 (discussing various arguments for, and
criticisms against, adoption of either "but for" or substantive relevance tests).
193. See Brilmayer, supra note 138, at 1459 (emphasizing importance of determining
underlying foundation for personal jurisdiction and supporting this foundation with proper
interpretation of "arise from or relate to").
194. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 84 (arguing that distinction between related and
unrelated contacts in personal jurisdiction analysis is based on state sovereignty).
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assumption, a state must overcome the limitations of state sovereignty by
justifying its assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents. 191 Brilmayer argues
that the most convincing justification, and to her the only sufficient justifi-
cation, is a state's right to regulate conduct within its boundaries. 196 If state
sovereignty is in fact the proper basis for the requirments of personal
jurisdiction, then substantive relevance may well be the proper test.19 The
substantive test essentially requires wrongful conduct by the defendant in the
forum state. 98 According to Brilmayer's analysis, without wrongful conduct
in the forum state, the state has no right to assert jurisdiction because it has
no regulatory interest in the conduct.'" Consequently, the "but for" test,
which does not require wrongful conduct in the forum state, would overstep
the boundary of the state's regulatory authority.M
Brilmayer's analysis, of course, depends on the legitimacy of her as-
sumption that state sovereignty is the basis for the distinction between related
and unrelated contacts. The support for the state sovereignty assumption
comes from the 1980 Supreme Court case of World Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.20' In World Wide the Court appeared to return somewhat to
the federalism and state sovereignty concepts emphasized so heavily in the
territorial doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, stating that state sovereignty is
relevant for jurisdictional purposes in that it places a limitation on the
sovereign power of other states to try cases in their courts. 2 The Court then
195. See id. at 85-86 (understanding Due Process Clause to require state to justify its
assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants).
196. See id. at 86 (suggesting only proper justification for burdening nonresident defendant
is exercise of state's regulatory authority). Brilmayer notes that when a state requires its own
citizens to litigate in its courts there can be no state sovereignty objections because exercising
authority over its own citizens is an act of state sovereignty. Id. at 85. When the burden is
placed on outsiders, however, the state must support this burden with adequate justification.
Id. at 85-86. Brilmayer argues that the best justification is the state's interest in regulating
activities within its borders. Id. at 86.
197. The conclusion that substantive relevance is the best test under the state sovereignty
theory necessarily requires the assumption that the exercise of a state's regulatory authority is
the only justification for a state to burden an out of state defendant, not just the best
justification. See supra note 196 (stating justification based on regulatory authority). But see
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1982) (implj'ing that adjudicatory authority of
forum state is important factor to consider).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25 (describing substantive test).
199. See supra notes 196-97 (discussing reasoning and necessary assumptions for conclusion
that state sovereignty requires substantive relevance).
200. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 86 (suggesting that basing jurisdiction on nonsub-
stantively related contacts would violate state sovereignty limitations of due process).
201. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
202. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980)
(indicating revival of federalism and state sovereignty concepts in personal jurisdiction). The
Court stated:
[We have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdic-
tional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution. The economic interdependence of the States
was foreseen and desired by the Framers.... [T]he Framers also intended that the
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concluded that "even if the forum state is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the state of its power to render a
valid judgment.'"'1 Professor Brilmayer has interpreted this language to
require a focus on a state's justification for burdening an out of state
defendant.204 As noted above, this justification is met only when the defendant
has engaged in in-state conduct that is substantively relevant to the cause of
action.2 0s
The state sovereignty argument fails, however, because the Supreme Court
essentially recanted much of the state sovereignty emphasis of World Wide
two years later in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinea.'6 In Insurance Corp. the Coprt stated that the requirements of
personal jurisdiction represent a restriction on state judicial power "not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.' So guided, it
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each state, in turn,
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express
or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id.
World Wide involved a products liability action brought in Oklahoma for recovery of
damages arising from an automobile accident in Oklahoma. Id. at 288. Plaintiffs purchased
their allegedly defective automobile in New York from a New York retailer and brought suit
against the retailer and its distributor, World Wide Volkswagen. 1d. The Supreme Court
quickly noted that neither defendant had any contact with the forum state of Oklahoma. Id.
at 289. In so concluding, the Court reasoned that the unilateral contacts of the plaintiffs with
the state of Oklahoma were not attributable to the defendants. Id. at 295. Furthermore, the
Court refused to assign significance to the fact that it was potentially foreseeable by the
defendants that customers would drive their automobiles in Oklahoma. Id. at 295-96. The
foreseeability that is critical, the court held, is that the defendants reasonably foresee the
possibility of litigation in the forum state. Id. at 297. Finding no such foreseeability in the
present case, the Court refused to permit jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at 299.
203. Id. at 294.
204. See Brilmayer, supra note 112, at 85-86 (suggesting that states must, according to
World Wide, justify their imposition of burdens of litigation on out of state defendants). In
light of the Supreme Court's announcement that even when litigation in a particular state
presents no burden at all on the out of state defendant jurisdiction will sometimes fail from
state federalism concerns, Brilmayer argues that the emphasis should not be the individual
defendant's right not to be burdened, but the right of the forum state to impose that burden.
Id.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200 (discussing argument that state sovereignty
limitations require substantively relevant contacts).
206. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
207. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982). See Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Perils of Nationwide Service of Process in a Bankruptcy
Context, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1199, 1218 (1991) (recognizing that Insurance Corp. rejected
state sovereignty emphasis of World Wide).
In Insurance Corp., the Court expressly modified its opinion in World Wide stating:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World Wide Volkswagen Corp.,
... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
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is possible to give a reading to World Wide that is consistent with Insurance
Corp. For instance, the World Wide Court stated that one function of the
minimum contacts analysis is to ensure that states do not breach the limits
"imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."
The Court, however, went on to explain that a defendant should have
minimum contacts with a state such that "he should reasonably anticipate
being haled in to court there." This statement arguably suggests that state
sovereignty does not define minimum contacts, and hence, does not limit
specific jurisdiction.210 Rather, state sovereignty is only a tangential beneficiary
of the due process protection of individual liberty. Regardless of the ability
to accord World Wide with Insurance Corp, the final word appears to be
that the individual liberty protection of due process provides the sole basis
of the limitations on personal jurisdiction.
1'
by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.
Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.10. This language appears to suggest that although
state sovereignty is a valid concern, this concern ultimately finds protection through the
safeguarding of a defendant's individual liberty interests.
Insurance Corp. involved an action for recovery under an insurance policy. Insurance
Corp., 456 U.S. at 698. The defendants included a large number of foreign based insurance
companies acting as excess insurers. Id. at 696. These defendants refused an order of the
district court to produce documents pertaining to the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 699. The district court, therefore, ruled that personal jurisdiction
was proper as a sanction for violation of a discovery order. Id. The Supreme Court upheld
the imposition of jurisdiction over the defendants, reasoning that the failure to comply with
the district court's discovery order operated as a waiver or admission of the personal jurisdiction
requirements. Id. at 709.
208. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
209. Id. at 297.
210. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse
of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 Nom.E DAm L. Rav. 699,
712 (1983) (noting that, arguably, World Wide Court was not suggesting that state sovereignty
would prevent jurisdiction in states where defendant has minimum contacts).
A discussion of state sovereignty was not necessary in World Wide. Id. at 715. The
World Wide Court was concerned primarily with emphasizing that jurisdiction is improper
without purposeful availment by the defendant of the "privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state." World Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. Without purposeful availment, the Court
concluded, a defendant does not have "notice that it is subject to suit there." Id. The Court
described this notice as critical to due process, and concluded that when it is present, a state
does not exceed its powers in asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 297-98. World Wide, therefore, may
have suggested only that state sovereignty is protected to the extent that an individual's due
process rights are protected, but that state sovereignty, in and of itself, does not provide or
establish the criteria by which an individual's rights are determined. Such a conclusion would
be consistent with Insurance Corp. Note, however, that reading World Wide without the
benefit of Insurance Corp. readily leads to a conclusion such as professor Brilmayer's. See
supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (discussing Brilmayer's reading of World Wide).
211. Ultimately, the holding in Insurance Corp. appears to be less of an explanation of
World Wide than a recantation of it. The clear statement of the Court in Insurance Corp.
was that the protection of individual liberty is the sole source of the restrictions on personal
jurisdiction. Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
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In providing a limit to personal jurisdiction, due process protects the
individual liberty interests of a defendant by requiring that the defendant
have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' 2 2 Thus, the basis for the distinction between related and unrelated
contacts must be that it is inherently more fair to require a defendant to
litigate in a foreign state when the defendant's contacts with that state played
some part in the injury leading to the cause of action.21 3 When a court relies
on the fact that the defendant's contact with the state played a part in the
cause of action, the court is applying specific jurisdiction. 2 4 In determining
how significant a part the defendant's contacts must play in the cause of
action, fairness must be the guideline.21l The question, then, is whether the
"but for" or substantive test provides the greater likelihood for fairness in
every case.
With fairness as the basis for the personal jurisdiction requirments, the
"but for" test prevails for two reasons. First, a "but for" relationship
establishes a logical threshold for specific jurisdiction. Without a "but for"
relationship, that is, if the injury leading to the cause of action would have
occurred absent the defendant's forum state contacts, it is reasonable to
refuse specific jurisdiction. 2 6 Second, the "but for" test foresees and provides
for the possibility that, in light of the circumstances as a whole, specific
jurisdiction may be proper over defendants with nonsubstantively related
contacts.21
7
212. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Insurance
Corp., 456 U.S. at 702-03 (restating that rule in International Shoe protects individual liberty
interest of out of state defendant); Lewis, supra note 210, at 727 (noting that personal
jurisdiction focuses on interests of individual litigants, not interests of state governments).
213. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985) (stressing that
defendant's must have "fair warning" that their activities in state may require them to litigate
matters there). The probability that an individual has "fair warning" would appear to drop
most dramatically between causes of action for which the defendant's contacts played some
part (at least a "but for" relationship), and causes of action for which the defendant's contacts
played no part (no "but for" relationship). Therefore, if courts must draw a line separating
the specific and general jurisdictional analysis, it is most appropriately drawn with the "but
for" relationship.
214. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 644 (suggesting that courts apply specific jurisdiction
analysis when "the nature of the claim" is considered in determination of personal jurisdiction).
Twitchel's article, while expressly rejecting the substantive test, makes no specific suggestion
as to when "the nature of the claim" should receive consideration. See id. at 652-63 (rejecting
substantive test and recognizing that claims having "some connection" to defendant's forum
contacts have stronger basis for jurisdiction than claims with no connection).
215. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 n.10 (1982) (clarifying that "only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement" is
due process and that due process is defined by "fairness" rule of International Shoe).
216. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that "but for" relationship maintains distinction between specific and general jurisdiction),
rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
217. See infra text accompanying notes 223-30 (discussing application of dual "reasona-
bleness" test to determine whether jurisdiction is proper in cases demonstrating only "but
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In comparison to "but for," the substantive test effectively precludes a
fair result when the defendant's forum state contacts are not substantively
relevant.218 If due process, and therefore, fair play and substantial justice,
are the standards for the personal jurisdiction requirments, adherence to the
substantive test would require the conclusion that substantive relevance defines
fairness. 219 The clear mandate of International Shoe denies that mechanical
guidelines can or should define fairness3m Courts may determine fairness
only through a case-by-case review of the circumstances as whole. Because
the substantive test fails to provide for such a determination in cases not
demonstrating substantive relevance, the "but for" test better serves the
standard of fair play and substantial justice.
The conclusion that the "but for" test provides the greatest possibility
for fairness in each case is not without qualification. Just as the substantive
test is underinclusive, the "but for" test is potentially overinclusive. 2 1 The
difference between the two flaws is that the underinclusive effect of the
substantive test is without remedy, whereas the overinclusiveness of the "but
for" test is controllable.'
The Ninth Circuit suggests that the "reasonableness" prong of the
personal jurisdiction test will safeguard against the over-application of the
for" relationship between contacts and cause of action); infra text accompanying note 236
(describing situation in which "but for" analysis is necessary to achieve fair result).
218. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (noting that substantive test is "bright
line," "all or nothing" test). The substantive test does not foresee the possibility that personal
jurisdiction could be fair despite the fact that the defendant's contact are not substantively
relevant to the cause of action.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12 (recognizing fairness as basis for personal
jurisdiction requirement). The object of the personal jurisdiction test is to insure fairness.
Concluding, therefore, that specific personal jurisdiction is improper when there is no sub-
stantive relevance to the defendant's contacts is to conclude that it is never fair to assert
specific jurisdiction in the absence of substantively related contacts. Thus, the substantive test
attempts to define fairness.
220. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (stating that
test for personal jurisdiction cannot be defined in mechanical terms). Granted, a test based
on fairess lacks clarity. Nonetheless, the Court apiiears to have willingly sacrificed clarity for
flexibility. For a discussion of how courts define "fair play and substantial justice," see
'*' generally Abramson, supra note 10.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61 (criticizing "but for" test as being too
expansive, allowing almost unlimited jurisdiction). The "but for" test will not eliminate from
consideration any potentially fair cases. Without proper safeguards, however, the "but for"
test also will include many unfair cases.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73 (stating that under substantive test, analysis
ends without further consideration if defendant's contacts have no substantive relevance to
cause of action). Generally, a substantively relevant contact is always sufficient but not always
necessary; thus, the substantive test is underinclusive. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying
text (identifying shortcomings of substantive test). By contrast, a "but for" contact is always
necessary but not always sufficient. See supra text accompanying note 216 (noting "but for"
relationship as minimum requirement for application of specific jurisdiction). To prevent over-
inclusiveness, courts can govern the application of the "but for" test with a heightened
"reasonableness" analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 223-30 (suggesting dual consid-
eration of reasonableness).
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"but for" test.2 This safeguard, however, may be inadequate. 22A The usual
"reasonableness" test, in addition to being highly deferential, 22  focuses
primarily on the inconvenience imposed on the out of state defendant.?2
Inconvenience is not the focus of the minimum contacts analysis.?27 The
Supreme Court has stated that the minimum contacts requirement protects
defendants by providing "fair warning" that their conduct may result in
litigation in the forum statem
A proper safeguard for the requirements of due process should measure
"reasonableness" twice: at the minimum contacts stage, and again at the
traditional "reasonableness" stage. At the minimum contacts stage the focus
should be not on the inconvenience of litigation, but on the existence of
factors that suggest reasonable foreseeability by the defendant of the possibility
of litigation in the forum state.229 Upon satisfaction of this test, the analysis
can proceed to the traditional "reasonableness" evaluation of the convenience
of the litigation. 230 Because the dual reasonableness test considers both the
foreseeability and convenience of litigation in the forum state, the test provides
an adequate safeguard for the standard of fair play and substantial justice.
Explicitly modifying the "but for" test with a dual reasonableness re-
quirement will insure that those cases demonstrating the minimum "but for"
relationship are properly "filtered," with only those cases satisfying "fair
play and substantial justice" remaining. With control of the overinclusive
potential of the "but for" test, the critics of "but for" are left only with
223. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64 (noting Ninth Circuit's use of "reasona-
bleness" prong of personal jurisdiction analysis to safeguard against abuses of "but for" test).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69 (questioning legitimacy of using "reason-
ableness" prong of personal jurisdiction analysis to prevent abuse of "but for" test).
225. See supra text accompanying note 18 (indicating that finding of minimum contacts
creates presumption of reasonableness; thus, courts deferentially apply reasonableness analysis).
226. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (empha-
sizing burden on defendant in making determination of reasonableness); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (same); Abramson, supra note 10, at 447 (recognizing
that Supreme Court cases indicate that burden on defendant is primary concern in assessing
reasonableness).
227. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (stating
that regardless of convenience of litigating in forum state, jurisdiction is improperly asserted
when defendant has not established minimum contacts).
228. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (stating that minimum contacts requirement
safeguards standard of fair play and substantial justice by providing "fair warning" to
defendants that their conduct may lead to litigation in forum state); World Wide, 444 U.S.
at 297 (same); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
229. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75 (emphasizing importance of foreseeability of
litigation in forum state in minimum contacts analysis). Factors considered in determining
reasonable foreseeability could include the quantity, quality, duration and purpose of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 (indicating that "reasonableness" analysis
follows finding of minimum contacts). After a finding of minimum contacts, utilizing the
minimum contacts "reasonableness" test, the traditional determination of, reasonableness can
follow. At this point, the use of the deferential "reasonableness" analysis is not problematic
because minimum contacts are already established.
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the argument that courts will abuse their discretion over fairness and 'reason-
ableness.' A basic faith in the judicial process, however, is necessarily
assumed in every facet of jurisprudence, and evidence suggests this assumption
is well foundedy 2 Accepting this assumption, the modified "but for" test
provides the surest method to achieve fairness in every case-and fairness in
every case should be the ultimate goal.
D. The Impact of "But For, " a Step Toward the Sliding Scale
Some commentators have suggested the elimination of the strict catego-
.rization of personal jurisdiction as "general" or "specific." 231 Indeed, it
appears that a byproduct of this categorical approach is the practice of
defining fair play and substantial justice in terms of whether a particular fact
pattern fits neatly into the "general" or "specific" paradigm. 2- A suggested
alternative to alleviate this problem is to establish a "sliding scale" for
personal jurisdiction whereby courts consider both the number of the defen-
dant's forum state contacts and the relatedness of those contacts to the cause
of action.25 Under such an approach, a defendant with many contacts with
the forum state, though falling short of "continuous and systematic," is still
subject to personal jurisdiction in a cause of action having some slight
relationship to the forum state contacts.
236
The problem with a pure sliding scale is that it abandons the general-
specific analysis already well integrated into the judicial system. 237 Moreover,
the specific and general categories are useful because they provide structure
231. See Bruce N. Morton, Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction
After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 9 PACE L. REv. 451, 453-58
(1989) (identifying criticisms of "fair play" standard, noting potential for inconsistent appli-
cation).
232. See Winton D. Woods, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: An Amicus Inquiry into the
Future of "Purposeful Availment", 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1393, 1396 n.16 (1990) (noting that
courts are not abusing their discretion over determination of reasonableness). Professor Woods
states:
If one thing emerges from a review of recent state court decisions it is that state
courts, if anything, tend to be unnecessarily protective of the rights of the defendant
who is summoned to trial in their forum. There is no evidence that state courts are
abusing their jurisdictional or choice of law powers.
Id. (emphasis added).
233. See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction:
Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAMN. L. Ray. 1 (1984) (suggesting abandonment
of specific and general analysis); Richman, supra note 55, at 1336-52 (suggesting "sliding
scale" approach to personal jurisdiction).
234. See Richman, supra note 55, at 1346 (noting that specific and general categories
foster "mechanical jurisprudence," that inhibits ability of courts to focus on true fairness
rather than categorical adherence).
235. See id. at 1336-52 (describing "sliding scale" approach).
236. See id. at 1340-45 (illustrating how "sliding scale" accounts for factual situations
not falling directly into specific or general category).
237. See id. at 1337 (recognizing that specific and general categories have gained substantial
acceptance in court system).
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for judicial decisions on personal jurisdiction. 238 The conflict, therefore, is
between the two important but seemingly incompatible goals of flexibility
and structure. The modified "but for" test offers a solution.
The modified "but for" test will allow courts to achieve flexibility without
completely sacrificing structure. The modified "but for" test expands specific
jurisdiction, allowing courts to engage in a "sliding scale" approach.2 9 When
a defendant's contacts have a "but for" relationship to the plaintiffs injury,
the court can apply a specific jurisdictional analysis.M The ultimate decision,
however, turns on an assessment of "reasonableness," which can include a
consideration of the number of contacts with the forum.2' By allowing a
dual consideration of the quantity and relatedness of the defendant's contacts,
the modified "but for" test offers structure and flexibility, thus insuring that
fair play and substantial justice remain the focus of personal jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
The "arise from or relate to" issue, when once again',presented to the
Supreme Court, offers an excellent opportunity to reacknowledge fairness as
the hallmark of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court already has re-
stricted the boundaries of general jurisdiction.2 2 Similarly restricting specific
jurisdiction with the adoption of the substantive test would solidify the
238. See id. (conceding that specific and general categories are beneficial in that they
provide structure for decisions on personal jurisdiction).
239. See Twitchell, supra note 28, at 662 (suggesting that courts apply specific jurisdiction
analysis to tenuously related claims). Expanding specific rather than general jurisdiction is
consistent with both logic and precedential authority. As a matter of logic and semantics,
general jurisdiction implies authority to adjudicate claims "generally," whether related to the
defendant's contacts or not. See id. at 637 (noting that general jurisdiction authorizes juris-
diction over any claim asserted against defendant). When a court, therefore, exercises general
jurisdiction, there should be no consideration of the specific claim asserted by the plaintiff.
Id. at 650-51. If the court must resort to a consideration of the specific claim in order to
determine that jurisdiction is fair, the court's ruling is by definition "specific" to the particular
cause of action at hand. See id. at 644. Because the "sliding scale" necessarily requires a dual
consideration of the number and relatedness of the defendant's contacts, the sliding scale
should be applied within the specific jurisdiction category. I
As a matter of judicial precedent, applying the scale to the general jurisdiction category
would require a modification or the Supreme Court's restriction on the use of general
jurisdiction. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(restricting general jurisdiction to cases showing "continuous and systematic" contacts with
forum state and denying that this threshold was met despite substantial showing of contacts
by defendant). The easiest way, therefore, to add flexibility to the present structure is to adopt
a "but for" interpretation of the "arise from or relate to" requirement for specific jurisdiction.
240. See supra text accompanying note 216 (suggesting that "but for" creates logical
threshold for application of specific jurisdiction).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 223-30 (discussing dual reasonableness test, which
includes consideration of factors such as quantity of defendant's forum contacts, as safeguard
against over-application of "but for" test).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27 (noting that Supreme Court has limited




establishment of two discrete "islands" of jurisdiction with an entire sea of
potentially fair and reasonable cases in between.?3 Such a result would be
inconsistent with a standard based on fair play and substantial justice.24
Alternatively, adopting the modified "but for" test would signal a rejection
of mechanical determinations of fairness, thus reaffirming the core principals
of International Shoe and its progeny.
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243. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (suggesting that fairness now is defined
often in terms of whether cases fit within strict categories of specific or general jurisdiction).
244. See supra text accompanying note 219 (indicating that adoption of substantive test
requires conclusion either that fairness is not standard for personal jurisdiction or that courts
should define fairness by substantive relevance).
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